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MEXICO-UNITED STATES ENERGY RELATIONS
AND NAFTA
REINIER LOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will focus primarily on what the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' will do for the energy trade relationship
between Mexico and the United States. It will also deal with some of
the related investment issues. 2 It is difficult to understand the NAFTA
energy negotiation, or the reason why energy has received special sectoral
treatment in both the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("FTA")3 and
in NAFTA, without some understanding of three factors. First, one must
consider the history of the energy trade relationship, especially in oil,
and how it influenced the negotiations. Second, one must look at the
political contexts in which both the FTA and NAFTA energy chapters
were negotiated. Finally, one must understand the distinctive nature of
energy markets, especially those-such as natural gas and electricity-
that are heavily regulated in the United States.
A. Recent History of the Energy Relationship in a Nutshell
I will not explore the circumstances surrounding the nationalization of
the oil production and electric industries in the 1930s in Mexico. Rather,
I will focus on what occurred after the 1973-74 "oil price shock" which
made oil trade a central issue in international relations for more than
a decade. Oil has tended to drive the public consciousness on the energy
trade.
The 1970s was a decade in which the OPEC cartel reached the height
of its power. That caused considerable anxiety in the United States. That
was also the decade in which Mexico's oil production sector was coming
* Of Counsel, Le Boeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, Washington, D.C.; Co-Author, The Canadal
United States Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Energy, 9 EmERoY L. J. 327 (1988); Chair, ABA
Committee on Energy, Section of Administrative Law, 1987-90; B. Comm. and LL.B., Rhodes
University, South Africa; B.C.L., Oxford University, England; LL.M., University of California;
admitted to bars of California (1973), England (1974), and D.C. (1979).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. 1 will leave it to Bill Kryzda, who I view as my ongoing source of wisdom on Mexican
issues, and to our other panelist, Pedro Ojeda, our legal expert from PEMEX, to tell us about
Mexican perceptions of NAFTA and energy. I am also pleased to learn that Mr. Ojeda will tell
us something about the restructuring of PEMEX and what that will mean for energy production
and trade. I gather from this conference's investment panel that there is a need for better public
understanding of what PEMEX has in fact done. My own focus will be on the drier, more legalistic
issues and I will happily leave the more controversial items, such as what role PEMEX will play
under NAFTA, to my colleagues.
3. Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in BAsic DocUtENTS OF INTEPNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW
353 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter FTA].
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into full bloom. The natural evolution of these circumstances was a
tremendous increase in Mexican oil exports to the United States. These
reached close to ninety percent of total Mexican exports at one point,
and were at about the eighty percent level in the late 1970s. For the
United States, Mexico was seen as a major alternative, a pressure valve,
to reduce the undue reliance on the volatile Persian Gulf region.
In 1980, however, the Mexican government adopted a national energy
plan which called for diversification away from excessive dependence on
the United States markets. No more than fifty percent of Mexican exports
were to go to any one country (i.e., the United States), and they were
not to comprise any more than twenty percent of United States imports.
This move by the Mexican government proved much less controversial
in the United States than parallel Canadian efforts to reduce United
States investments in the Canadian oil and gas production sector. This
was because the new Mexican policy comported quite well with the general
United States policy of favoring supply diversification. Moreover, the
foregone imports would largely be going to United States industrial allies
in the global oil conflict, such as Japan; hence, they would eventually
go into the same oil-consuming countries' pot in the case of another oil
crisis that might trigger the International Energy Agency oil-sharing pro-
visions.
The 1980s, therefore, saw a drawing back from what had looked like
a rapidly growing trade relationship, especially in oil and natural gas.
There was also a steady weakening of the OPEC cartel and the emergence
of a finely-tuned international market which became the primary driving
force in oil trade. Finally, in 1986, there was the dramatic collapse of
world oil prices. This combination of events had a very damaging financial
effect on the Mexican national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos ("PE-
MEX"), and its ability to invest in its supply infrastructure. It was
probably exacerbated by the Mexican diversification policy which added
one to two dollars per barrel in transportation charges to the delivered
price of oil displaced from the United States market. The infrastructure
problem was one of the principal reasons why the expected increase in
natural gas exports to the United States that had been anticipated in the
late 1970s never materialized in the 1980s. Mexico simply did not have
the pipeline capacity to get the gas to market, nor the capital to build
it.
Electricity trade prior to NAFTA was limited mostly to relatively minor
exchanges across the border, usually for reliability reasons. Again, some
ambitious notions that had emerged in the early 1980s to build large
power plants in the Mexican border areas to supply lucrative United
States markets, such as California, never materialized. The reasons were
partly investment-related, such as the lack of capital for what is a very
capital-intensive industry. Moreover, the rapid growth in demand in the
United States electric markets, which had averaged nationally around
seven percent per annum for several decades, dramatically turned around
in the 1980s; that growth rate has never returned.
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B. The Political Context of the NAFTA Negotiations
Because the decade before the NAFTA negotiations saw few realizations
of the ambitious expectations about energy trade between the two coun-
tries, the United States and Mexico entered into the negotiations with
energy being much less of a driving force than it had been in the context
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. In the FTA negotiations,
energy has been described as perhaps the principal driving force that led
to that agreement. Indeed, the energy negotiation was often so far out
in front of the rest of the negotiation that it actually produced the general
FTA text in areas such as non-tariff barriers before the groups assigned
those tasks did so.
The U.S.-Canada energy relationship had been plagued by vitriolic
trade wars in the 1970s. Moreover, as part of its national energy program
in the early 1980s, the Canadian government imposed restrictions on
foreign investment in its oil and gas sector that were overtly designed
to drive down the level of United States investment from the very high
eighty percent level it had reached, as well as introducing other restrictions
that angered United States interests. So serious were these energy disputes
that Allan Gotlieb, the former Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
reports that when he took office in the early 1980s, the energy relationship
was the principal cause of the very sour diplomatic climate between the
two countries. 4
This U.S.-Canada political context is important because it shows that
the two market-oriented governments pushed the FTA so hard as a way
to bury this unhappy history. The FTA enshrined in the trade relationship
the free market principles that both the Reagan and Mulroney governments
espoused in order to protect what had become a burgeoning energy trade
relationship-in most years in excess of $10 billion per annum. The goal
was to ensure that the restrictive trade practices that had characterized
the energy trade warfare of the 1970s and early 1980s could not be
repeated.
Hence, in the FTA negotiations, energy clearly was a central feature
in the entire negotiation. It produced a special energy chapter that both
applied the general rules for trade in goods to energy and developed
some special rules.' There was even a dispute resolution procedure designed
specifically for energy in Article 905, in addition to the general dispute
resolution mechanisms in Chapter Twenty of the FTA.6 Article 905 was
really a sort of prophylactic procedure that required the two parties to
negotiated under the auspices of their respective energy departments/
ministries when either felt that the regulatory actions of the other were
causing problems such as violating the agreement or applying it unfairly.7
While NAFTA was concluded in the generally similar political context
of market-oriented governments seeking liberalization of trade and in-
4. Reinier H.J.H. Lock, Interview: Allan Gotlieb, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 34 (1989).
5. See FTA, supra note 3.
6. Id. ch. 20.
7. Id. art. 905.
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vestment rules, there was not the same compelling need to deal with
energy issues. Indeed, energy was one of the laggards in the negotiation.
The energy negotiation started later than many others and was viewed
as one of the big problem areas right up to the conclusion of the
negotiation. In the public debate prior to the formal negotiation, the
question often raised was whether energy was or should be "on or off
the table."
Of course, that characterization of the issue was silly. There was already
significant energy trade between the two countries, which under NAFTA
would be characterized as "trade in goods." It would therefore either
be covered by the general provisions of NAFTA or require the negotiation
of exceptions to those general provisions.
Moreover, it soon became apparent that the negotiation would be for
a trilateral treaty and, therefore, would at least have to take into account
the U.S.-Canada relationship and the special energy provisions in the
FTA, if not to build upon them. Predictably, NAFTA did build upon
many of the FTA energy provisions, an inevitability that was reinforced
by the relatively short time frame in which the energy clauses were
negotiated.
At the heart of what I have characterized as the silly question, whether
energy should be "on or off the table," was the issue of whether the
status of PEMEX as a Mexican state monopoly should be the subject
of the negotiation; or, to put it more precisely, whether that monopoly
status had to be broken up before an energy trade agreement based upon
free market principles could be concluded. This question was almost as
silly, for reasons I will elaborate. In fact, the energy negotiation did
take place and produced an agreement. Energy was clearly on the table,
and the PEMEX monopoly was in large part maintained.
C. The Distinctive Nature of Regulated Energy Markets
Before looking at the specific provisions of the energy chapter of
NAFTA, it is important to recognize what is distinctive about the energy
industry and its market structures that made a special energy negotiation
necessary in both the FTA and NAFTA and that produced special energy
chapters in each. I was struck by the insightful comments of Linda
Powers and Steve Zamora on the financial services panel because they
have application to the energy area for very similar reasons. Ms. Powers
points out that the regulatory nature of the financial services markets
makes application of the general free trade principles all the more chal-
lenging because one has to pick one's way through a myriad of difficult
details of regulation and decide which should be at issue in the negotiation
and which should not.8 Mr. Zamora makes a point that I think is crucial;
namely, that this characteristic appears to make the exercise of agreeing
on and implementing trade rules all the more intrusive on the domestic
markets." I believe the same comments are true of the regulated energy
8. See Linda Powers, NAFTA and the Regulation of Financial and Other Services, 1 U.S.-
MEx. L.J. 65 (1993).
9. See Stephen T. Zamora, Comments on the Regulation of Financial Services in Mexico Under
NAFTA, I U.S.-MEx. L.J. 77 (1993).
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markets but that the problems of regulation are even greater and more
complex than in the financial services area. Indeed, this comparison
underscores what is truly distinctive about the financial services area-
the regulatory aspect rather than the "services" aspect. Energy, which
comprises trade in goods, has the same regulation problem, exacerbated
by more state monopoly ownership.
In energy, I think this problem is so formidable that I would turn
Mr. Zamora's comment on its head and suggest that it is the predominance
of monopoly power and regulation in the energy area that has great
potential for being unduly intrusive upon the free trade relationship and
in extreme cases even threatening toward that relationship, rather than
the reverse. The real problem is how the trade rules can be made and
implemented to discipline effectively economic regulation and market
power to their mandates. In short, the real problem may be how to
make the trade rules sufficiently intrusive on domestic energy regulation
and monopoly structures without causing a political backlash.
A critical characteristic of two of the four main areas of energy trade
in the U.S.-Canada relationship, natural gas and electricity, is that in
major parts these markets are not competitive. Often they are viewed as
natural monopolies to be subjected either to economic (or "public utility")
regulation, or to state ownership, as means of disciplining the monopoly
power to ensure that it does not damage the national interest. Hence,
in both the United States and Canada, we have a glorious jumble of
both economic regulation and state ownership.
Economic regulation itself presents a complex matrix at both the federal
and state/provincial levels of government in each country, with elements
of government ownership thrown into the mix, such as the provincial
utilities in Canada and the federal power marketing agencies like the
Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States. To complicate this matrix
further, there is a subtle interaction in each country between the operation
of the antitrust/competition laws and economic regulation, again with
both sets of laws functioning at both the federal and state/provincial
levels. The United States, for instance, has pervasive economic regulation
of both the electric and natural gas industries in almost every state and,
in most states, the industries are subject, at least in theory, to state
antitrust laws.
D. The Approach to Energy Regulation and Monopoly Power in the
Trade Negotiations
1. The Harmonization Issue
Because the underlying goal of a trade treaty is to eliminate barriers
to trade in order to permit open and fair competition within the free
trade zone, a critical question arose in both the FTA and the NAFTA
negotiations. The question centered on the degree to which the two
agreements would require changes in the domestic energy markets to
achieve the proverbial "level playing field" (a term used ad nauseam in
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the domestic energy policy debate in the United States), a concept of
fair competition which is the term often used in the European Community.
For the trade negotiators, dealing with this question really amounted
to assessing the degree to which the trade agreement would have to create
some level of harmonization between the domestic laws or regulations
and the markets which they govern, and how this could be achieved.
The notion of harmonization is potentially very intrusive upon domestic
laws and is thus highly controversial. Indeed, in negotiating the FTA,
the United States negotiators tended to avoid the term in order not to
arouse Canadian sensitivities. The issue, however, was raised in the FTA
negotiations specifically in the context of the antitrust/competition laws.
Harmonization really is part of a broader challenge that is endemic
in comprehensive bilateral trade agreements such as the FTA and NAFTA.
These agreements go further than creating the sorts of trade rules typical
in multilateral agreements, and they have to address the degree to which
the two domestic economies need to be integrated either through har-
monization of domestic rules or through subjecting them to overriding
and potentially very intrustive international rules. This may not be a
sharp distinction and may simply be a matter of degree, but it is an
important distinction nonetheless. In the energy area, the issue often
comes down to a quite subtle distinction between regulatory rules of the
domestic market that discriminate specifically against competition from
the other party, as opposed to those rules which simply suppress com-
petition generally. Again, the distinction is not that clear cut in practice,
but it is important.
2. The U.S.-Canada FTA Approach
In the FTA energy negotiation there was relatively little effort to achieve
harmonization of domestic energy laws, partly because of Canadian sen-
sitivities but mostly because of the formidable presence of both economic
regulation and monopoly power, and because of the tremendous variation
of that combination in each country. Notably, this was also true of the
antitrust/competition laws although the issue of harmonization, and the
relationship of those laws to the anti-dumping/countervailing duty laws,
was shunted off into the Chapter 19 "Working Group."' 0 This group
was supposed to come up with some grand resolution of all these issues
within seven years.
In the energy area in the FTA, there was only some very minor tinkering
with three quite discrete areas of domestic policies that directly affected
cross-border trade. Generally, however, both countries took the view that
their existing federal regulatory structures were consistent with the FTA
if implemented properly, and both were very conscious that most of the
challenge would lie in proper implementation. Subsequent history certainly
supports that thesis. Moreover, the exercise in the FTA to ensure that
10. FTA, supra note 3, ch. 19.
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domestic laws did not directly undermine the trade rules was limited to
the federal area. There was no systematic effort even to identify specific
problem laws or policies in the fifty United States and ten Canadian
provinces, a task that probably would have overwhelmed the energy
negotiators. The question of consistency of these laws with the FTA was
left to the implementation stage. However, section 103 of the FTA did
impose a general obligation on the parties to ensure that necessary
measures are taken to give effect to the FTA, including observance of
the agreement by state/provincial and local governments.
The FTA, therefore, made no real effort to harmonize either the natural
gas and electricity industries, or the enormous variation in the governance
of these industries, to any type of standard regime or norm. For example,
there was no effort to deal with the critical issue of transmission access
in the natural gas and the electric power areas. Hence, a United States
electric utility might block a Canadian competitor from reaching a United
States power market for which both were competing by denying it use
of the United States utility's transmission system to get to the market."
Indeed, the only effort to address this issue in the FTA was the requirement
in Annex 905.2 that the United States should "cause the Bonneville Power
Administration ("BPA") to modify its Intertie Access Policy so as to
afford British Columbia Hydro treatment no less favorable than the most
favorable treatment afforded to utilities located outside the Pacific North-
west.' '12 In fact, that put B.C. Hydro in the same unenviable position
as the other domestic United States parties outside the Pacific Northwest.
For years the California utilities had been complaining about BPA using
the Intertie Access Policy to exclude them unfairly from purchasing freely
in the Northwest power supply markets.
To note how little the FTA did on issues like that is not to criticize.
Indeed, there was probably great wisdom in the general approach of
leaving the mixture of economic regulation and monopoly power in place
and attempting to work around this with some overarching trade rules
and processes. For instance, the United States Congress had tried to deal
with the highly controversial issue of transmission access in electricity
for fifty-seven years, ever since it enacted the basic scheme for federal/
state regulation of the industry in Part II of the Public Utility Act of
1935.13 It was only in October of 1992 that Congress finally moved to
give the relevant federal regulatory agency, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"), authority to mandate transmission access.' 4 To
have attempted to gain such an ability for foreign power producers through
the "back door" of the NAFTA negotiation would have added a major
new constituency, most United States electric utilities, to NAFTA's op-
ponents. '"
11. The transmission access issue was at the heart of the electricity reform legislation considered
in Congress in 1992 (and ultimately enacted as Title VII of the Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No.
102-486, 1992 U.S.S.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)). It should resolve such a problem.
12. FTA, supra note 3, annex 905.2 (Regulatory and Other Measures).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1992).
14. Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722, 1992 U.S.S.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 2906.
15. Notably, the transmission access issue is also proving to be one of the toughest policy nuts
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The basic approach of the FTA thus was to let each country work
out its own relationship between competition, regulation, and state own-
ership, and then to attempt to superimpose upon this disparate regime
overarching general rules for trading goods, mostly based on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") rules. 16 While these rules
act as general guideposts, they do not tell us a great deal about how
they will be applied in the context of the regulated industries. They are,
however, enormously important to the oil trade which, in the U.S.-
Canada context at least, has been left for over a decade to a largely
unregulated free market in goods, with prices established in sophisticated
world oil markets. They ensure that there will be no reversion to the
oil trade wars of the 1970s. In the Energy Chapter of the FTA, 17 this
GATT regime was constderably tightened in one or two criticl areas
(namely the "exceptions"), again to prevent any backsliding to the trade
war era.
3. The NAFTA Approach
What is different about NAFTA is that the three Mexican industries
most likely to figure significantly in Mexican trade with the United States
and Canada-oil, natural gas, and electricity-are all dominated by the
two giant state monopolies, PEMEX and the state electric company, the
Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad ("CFE"). This, of course, presents a
stark contrast to the complexity of private and public ownership and
regulation in both the United States and Canada.
Predictably, the status of these state monopolies became the central
focus of the extremely sensitive energy negotiations, which were cloaked
in secrecy. The issue was whether NAFTA should require any significant
change in the status of PEMEX and CFE, or in the oil, natural gas,
and electricity industries. There was tremendous pressure from the United
States oil and gas production sector, the "oil patch," to gain inroads
into the PEMEX monopoly over oil and natural gas production and
supply and to open these sectors up for U.S. investors. Because the U.S.
oil patch has tended to dominate many aspects of domestic U.S. energy
policy, the U.S. negotiators tried very hard to gain concessions to require
PEMEX to open up its oil and gas reserves to a greater level of in-
volvement by the U.S. private sector. The negotiators report that this
effort went on until the last minute. The Mexican government, however,
while prepared to make a few direct concessions (some of which were
already planned in any case), politely said "no" to most of these requests.
to crack in the European Communities' effort to integrate their electricity and natural gas markets
under the so-called "EC92" initiative. Two European Commission directives, one in electricity and
one in natural gas, to open up these markets through "third party access" have both run into
serious political trouble because of their controversial nature.
16. See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 10, 1947, 55 UNTS 194, reprinted
in BAsIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc LAW 3 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand
eds., 1990).
17. FTA, supra note 3, ch. 9.
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The result was predictable. The status of PEMEX and CFE was not
harmonized to the mish-mash of competition, regulation, and state own-
ership that exists in the United States. Nevertheless, when this basic
outcome became public shortly before the three governments released the
summary of the NAFTA text in August, it was hailed in the U.S. press
as a major defeat for the United States on the energy issue. The Wall
Street Journal's report was replete with complaints from the U.S. oil
patch about how little had been achieved. 18 It showed no apparent
appreciation of what had really been achieved in the oil and natural gas
area, let alone the significant achievements in other areas such as elec-
tricity, which were relegated to a single sentence in the report.
II. NAFTA: THE ENERGY TEXT
A. The Principles Governing Energy Trade
What, then, was actually achieved in the energy negotiations? The
starting point, of course, is the special chapter devoted to energy, Chapter
Six, titled "Energy and Basic Petrochemicals." Given the earlier debate
as to whether energy would be "on or off the table," the mere existence
of a distinct energy chapter was perhaps an achievement, although as
indicated this was almost inevitable because the negotiation was trilateral
and would have to build upon or deal with the specific energy chapter
in the FTA. Chapter Six covers the four basic areas of energy trade:
oil (in both crude oil and refined product), natural gas, electricity, and
coal. "Basic petrochemicals," a derivative of the oil and gas production
sector, is also included because of the scope of the Mexican constitutional
monopoly granted to PEMEX.
The principles governing the Energy Chapter are set forth in Article
601. The first of these requires the parties to "confirm their full respect
for their constitutions." This pays homage to the Mexican insistence at
the outset of the negotiations that NAFTA should not impinge upon
basic energy principles in the Mexican Constitution, such as the right of
the Mexican State to reserve certain activities to itself. This does not,
however, legitimize the monopoly status of PEMEX and CFE as such
(see below). This was conceded in principle early in the negotiations.
There is considerable room for interpretation, however, as to the actual
scope of the monopoly required by the Mexican Constitution and as to
what activities it may engage in, evident from the relative flexibility with
which the Mexicans had already adjusted the parameters of those mo-
nopolies. The American negotiators, whatever their views on the issue,
could hardly tell the Mexican negotiators what their own Constitution
did or did not permit.
The second basic principle recognizes that there should be increased
trade in energy and basic petrochemicals to be achieved through "sustained
18. James Bovard, NAFTA's Protectionist Bent, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1992, at A12.
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and gradual liberalization," presumably of the trade rules but also,
potentially, of domestic energy markets. Hence, the Energy Chapter is
seen only as a starting point in a dynamic process of liberalization that
is specifically endorsed by the parties.
Finally, the parties recognize the importance of having "viable and
internationally competitive energy and petrochemical sectors." This would
seem to suggest going far beyond normal trade rules. A commitment to
enhance international competitiveness of a country's industries might
require a good deal more than free trade rules and could have very little
to do with free trade. U.S. negotiators have characterized this language
as a horatory statement of the obvious.
B. The Basic Energy Trade Rules
In essence, the Energy Chapter of NAFTA follows the FTA quite
closely with respect to the basic trade rules. First, it incorporates and
reaffirms the basic GATT rules in trading goods. 9 That is important in
the FTA and in NAFTA because energy, especially oil, was one of the
areas which gained notoriety by virtue of the parties' (particularly the
United States and Canada) ignoring the GATT rules to the point that
there was even some question in the popular debate as to whether the
rules applied to energy at all. This language made clear that Mexico was
setting aside the special treatment of energy in its Provisional Application
of GATT. The affirmation is also important because it clears up any
lingering doubts that trade in electricity is "trade in goods," subject to
the GATT disciplines.
Chapter Six also contains the same extensions as the FTA on the
GATT rules to cover most forms of quantitative restrictions, minimum
or maximum export price requirements, and minimum'or maximum import
price requirements (except as permitted by the anti-dumping/countervailing
duty rules). These extensions essentially cover the sorts of practices that
had developed in the U.S.-Canada oil war era and that were not une-
quivocally covered by the GATT rules themselves. For similar reasons,
export taxes are prohibited for conservation reasons unless they are part
of a general tax on consumption which applies equally to domestic
consumption.
The Energy Chapter also contains provisions similar to those in the
FTA that deal with the problem of trade restrictions imposed against
third countries that might upset the balance of energy trade within the
free trade area. For instance, a United States imposition of an import
fee on oil from other countries could significantly influence the volume
of Canadian and Mexican imports into the U.S. market because there
would then be more price competition. This is one of several special
features that reflects recognition of the point made earlier that, in de-
signing international trade rules for three already quite closely integrated
19. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603.
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and adjacent economies, the negotiators have to be sensitive to the impact
of trade rules on domestic markets.
NAFTA recognizes the ability of a party imposing restrictions on a
non-party's goods also to adopt rules to prevent NAFTA from being
used as a back door to avoid those restrictions, such as by first importing
the good into one of the other parties' territories or exporting it via the
other parties. 20 Note, however, that if a party imposes restrictions on
energy or basic petrochemical imports from a non-party, NAFTA requires
"consultation" between the three parties at the request of any of them
"with a view to avoiding undue interference with or distortion of pricing,
marketing and distribution arrangements in another Party.' '21
Another special feature of the FTA Energy Chapter repeated in NAFTA
that related very much to the special history of U.S.-Canada energy trade
was an effort to modify the coterie of exceptions recognized in GATT
to the general trade rules. These fall into two broad areas. The first
area encompasses national security exceptions, which created a wide "barn
door" in the 1970s for restrictive trade provisions. These were greatly
narrowed in scope in NAFTA. 22 Mexico did not accept this narrower
version; hence, Annex 607 excludes this version as between Mexico and
the other parties and applies the broader GATT exceptions. I suspect
that this was related to general Mexican concerns about sovereignty and
national security. The second area is a group of exceptions which can
broadly be characterized as dealing with situations of domestic supply
shortfall and which cover a variety of circumstances, such as exhaustion
of natural resources, short supply situations, or price stabilization plans.
To simplify a quite complex provision, NAFTA permits such restrictions
only if they do not upset the historical proportion of trade between the
parties in the energy good concerned, do not create differences between
the export and domestic prices, and do not upset "normal channels of
supply" to the other parties.2 3 Again, Mexico did not accept this narrowing
of the GATT exceptions, and Annex 605 excludes this version as between
Mexico and the other parties.
Another FTA provision that was adopted by all three parties was their
agreement to recogni-e the rights of other parties to permit "incentives"
(subsidies) for oil and gas exploration and development. 4 Also repeated
from the FTA is the provision which protects the Canadian and United
States position in the International Energy Program ("IEP"), which is
the oil-sharing arrangement between the oil consuming nations developed
under the auspices of the International Energy Agency. The IEP ar-
rangement was essentially in response to the perceived oil supply crises
of the 1970s.
20. Id. art. 603(3).
21. Id. art. 603(4).
22. Id. art. 607.
23. Id. art. 605. These provisos essentially duplicate those in the FTA.
24. Id. art. 608(2).
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C. "National Treatment"
Perhaps the most important guiding principle in the energy chapter,
arguably in NAFTA itself, is the incorporation of the "national treatment"
principle which is set forth in Article 301 and which is part of Chapter
Three. This chapter, "National Treatment and Market Access for Goods,"
contains a short section on "national treatment" and then sets forth the
basic tariff provisions for trading goods under the Agreement.
Article 301 adopts the GATT definition of national treatment and
incorporates the basic GATT provision in this regard. Also crucial is the
fact that Article 301 picks up the FTA application of the GATT rule
to the effect that national treatment "shall mean, with respect to a state
or province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment
accorded by such state or province to any like, directly competitive or
substitutable goods, as the case may be, of the Party of which it forms
a part. '2
This provision really implies most favored state/province treatment for
the foreign goods, i.e., that they should receive the same treatment as
goods produced within the state/province concerned even if the state/
province discriminates against other states within its country. Nevertheless,
given the constraints of the Canadian and United States Constitutions-
such as the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution-there
is probably not much room for interstate/interprovincial discrimination.
Although there are numerous laws cited in Annex 301.3 as to where
the national treatment principle does not apply, that principle will prove
to be enormously important in the energy area, where it essentially
translates into a requirement for non-discriminatory treatment for the
energy goods of the other party by the federal or state/provincial gov-
ernments. Notable is the specific incorporation of the national treatment
principle into the energy chapter in Article 606, which deals with "energy
regulatory measures" and specifically provides that such measures are
subject to the disciplines of the national treatment principle (and also
to the export and import restrictions in Article 603 and the export tax
provisions in Article 604). Hence, the national treatment principle directly
tells energy regulators not to discriminate in their regulatory fora between
the goods of the foreign country and domestic energy goods. This principle
of non-discrimination was an underlying theme in the FTA. Here, it is
made more explicit.
Certainly in the United States and Canada, the notion of proscribing
discriminatory treatment is one with which energy regulators are quite
familiar. Standards such as "no undue discrimination" are a central part
of their regulatory weaponry. National treatment will therefore be a
guiding principle in the crucial exercise of applying the NAFTA provisions.
Furthermore, the FTA in Article 502 took the vital step of applying this
principle to state and provincial governments, and, as noted, that provision
was carried over into NAFTA.
25. Id. art. 301(2).
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D. New Energy Provisions
In addition to incorporating the basic elements of most of the FTA's
Energy Chapter, Chapter Six of NAFTA adds two new provisions that
I think are of some significance.
1. Import/Export Licensing
The first important provision is that parties may administer a system
of import and export licensing for energy and basic petrochemical goods
as long as the system is operated "in a manner consistent with" NAFTA,
including Article 1502(1).26 That article, in the Competition and Mo-
nopolies Chapter, permits parties to "designate" a monopoly, subject to
certain restrictions set forth in Article 1502. I will discuss Chapter Fifteen
below.
Annex 603.6 to the energy chapter then lists a number of specific
goods as to which Mexico may restrict the granting of import and export
licenses "for the sole purpose of reserving foreign trade in these goods
to itself." ' 27 The point is to reserve the Mexican government's right to
limit the ability to import and export energy goods to its state monopolies.
However, this does not exempt these goods from the other disciplines
of NAFTA, such as the Chapter 15 provisions relating to monopolies
and state enterprises (see below). The advantage of annexes to the Agree-
ment, of course, is that they can be more readily and discretely amended,
for instance, as when the Mexican government sees fit to liberalize its
import and export license rules. Such restrictions are fairly alien to the
United States or Canadian contexts for the very reason that neither is
dominated by a single nation-wide monopoly as to any of the energy
industries. In the European Community ("EC"), however, similar res-
trictions imposed by some of the Member States have recently come
under attack both from the European Commission and from the European
Court of Justice. Those attacks are made pursuant to some very clear
mandates in the European Economic Community treaty itself and in the
1985 Single Europe Act to integrate the inter-Member State markets.
2. Disruption of Contractual Relationships
Article 606(2) requires that:
[e]ach Party shall seek to ensure that in the application of any energy
regulatory measure, energy regulatory bodies within its territory avoid
disruption of contractual relationships to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, and provide for orderly and equitable implementation appro-
priate to such measures.28
I think this provision represents an important advance over the FTA
in terms of developing one crucial guiding principle to deal with the
26. Id. art. 603(5).
27. Id. annex 603.6.
28. Id. art. 606(2).
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problem that economic regulation potentially can pose to a competitive,
contractual regime, and hence to the development of the "level playing
field" within the new trilateral energy market. The FTA had attempted
to deal with the problem of regulatory interference in the market through
a dispute resolution mechanism. NAFTA prefers to deal with it through
what I would characterize as several overarching principles in the Agree-
ment that, taken together, will provide a more effective discipline on
both economic regulation and on state monopolies than did the FTA.
It is notable that the summary of NAFTA, released in August when its
conclusion was first announced, refers to provisions designed to create
a stable regulatory environment.2 9
One of the most difficult problems in attempting to create competitive
markets in a regulated industry in which long-term contracts may be
central is the potential for regulatory interference (sometimes viewed as
a necessity on public policy grounds) with those contracts when their
pricing provisions get out of sync with market conditions. It is an endemic
problem where economic regulators are given a great deal of latitude to
act in the "public interest" with regard to the commercial sector, as
they typically are in the United States. While the NAFTA provision will
not provide any failsafe mechanism to prevent such regulatory interference
with market contracts, it does recognize an important principle that should
help to curb regulatory excesses.
E. Dispute Resolution and Overarching Principles
I am quite enthusiastic about the NAFTA approach of developing
overarching trade principles to discipline both economic regulation and
state monopolies because I do not believe that the special dispute resolution
mechanism set forth in Article 905 of the FTA would prove to be workable
when a serious and intractable dispute arises over a measure adopted by
one party's regulators. Article 905 was clearly intended to build upon a
series of less formal consultation mechanisms, some of which had existed
even before the Agreement, such as the Energy Consultative Mechanism
("ECM") between Canada and the United States. Such mechanisms have
tended to work at several levels of government, even to the point, for
instance, of putting the staff of the United States' FERC and Canada's
National Energy Board ("NEB") into the same room for the purpose
of dealing with and resolving quite technical regulatory issues. I am not
suggesting that this does not work in most cases. When, however, the
dispute has elevated to the sort of intractable slugging match that has
been seen between the Government of Alberta and the California Public
Utilities Commission ("CPUC") over California's policies towards im-
ported gas from the Canadian oil patch, it may not (and perhaps, should
not be expected to) work. I question whether the two federal energy
departments/ministries are really going to be able to facilitate resolution
29. See Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, at 32 (1992) (prepared
by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States).
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or to be able to exert real pressure on state/provincial agencies to resolve
their differences. Such is the nature of federalism in both Canada and
the United States, and in Canada it is particularly strong in the energy
area.
It is for this reason that I have argued at conferences 30 that what may
be needed in the energy area is some type of private right of action for
aggrieved non-government entities-for example, a Canadian company
against the CPUC-perhaps enforceable in the federal courts of the
country whose regulatory body or monopoly is the subject of the com-
plaint. I realize that the notion of private sector rights of action is
probably an anathema to most government free trade negotiators. I am
delighted, however, to note that Professor Sohn raises the question more
generally as to NAFTA t. 3 I suggest that it is a subject of much interest
to the American Bar Association.
My notion of a private right of action did not see the light of day
in the NAFTA context. Instead, NAFTA suggests another, and perhaps
more productive, route-the development of more explicit principles to
discipline domestic economic regulation and state monopolies in order
to ensure that they do not unduly interfere with the effort to create a
free market trading system between the three countries. I have stressed
this issue of the adequacy of the dispute resolution mechanisms because
so much of the efficacy of the energy provisions in NAFTA will, I think,
depend on how these provisions are applied in the domestic regulatory
context and how they are applied by state monopolies such as PEMEX
and CFE.
While the new approach of overarching principles is appealing, I am
a little concerned about tho complete abandonment of any recognized
dispute resolution mechanism specific to energy. Perhaps the layers of
informal consultation that I mentioned will suffice. Moreover, any party
may use the more formal dispute resolution mechanisms of Chapter
Twenty, and other general remedies of NAFTA, for energy disputes. My
only lingering regret as to the abandonment of Article 905 of the FTA
is that the mechanism seemed better suited to the Mexican-United States
context than the U.S.-Canada context. The idea of putting the respective
energy departments/ministries in the same room with the complainant
and PEMEX or CFE strikes me as being more practical than the more
public and politicized disputes that can spring up in dozens of govern-
mental arenas in the U.S.-Canada context.
F. Disciplining Economic Regulation and State Monopolies
The other overarching principle developed in NAFTA that I think is
especially important for energy is not in the Energy Chapter at all.
30. See, e.g., Reinier H. Lock, Rights and Remedies of Regulated Energy Entities in International
Trade Agreements - The North American Experience (1991) (paper presented in Montreal, Canada
at the International Bar Association's Regional Energy Law Seminar, Integrating International Energy
Markets).
31. See Louis B. Sohn, An Abundance of Riches: GATT and the NAFTA Provisions for
Settlement of Disputes, 1 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 3 (1993).
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NAFTA expands into a full chapter, titled "Competition Policy, Mo-
nopolies and State Enterprises," a single monopolies article in a catch-
all chapter of the FTA. Chapter Fifteen of NAFTA picks up the FTA
Article 2210 language that parties may "designate a monopoly. '3 2 If they
do so, however, they have to provide "prior written notification" to the
other parties and attempt to "minimize or eliminate any nullification or
impairment of benefits under this Agreement." 3
What I think is most crucial is that Article 1502(3) expands on the
FTA provision to develop an overarching principle that "[e]ach Party
shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the
application of other measures, that any privately-owned monopoly that
it designates and any government monopoly that it maintains or desig-
nates:"
(1) not act in a manner inconsistent with the Party's NAFTA obli-
gations in exercising delegated government authorities;
(2) act in accordance with "commercial considerations" in trading in
the relevant market (most relevant, of course to state monopolies);
(3) "provides non-discriminatory treatment" to investments, goods
and services from other Parties in the relevant market; and
(4) not use its monopoly position to engage in anti-competitive practices
in a non-monopolized market that might adversely effect the invest-
ments of or trade with other parties.3 4
Article 1502(3), therefore, suggests the development of a pro-competitive
principle that attempts to encompass potential problems emanating both
from economic regulation and from state monopoly in energy sectors
where monopoly power is either endemic or may be viewed as desirable.
The effort is to create some type of oversight by the national governments
of these regimes by imposing certain broad standards.
These standards are in fact far-reaching and could potentially impose
stringent limitations on the actions of state or private monopolies. Ap-
parently, the negotiators believed they are necessary. This provision is
not applicable to procurement by government agencies. This exception,
however, applies only to procurement for governmental purposes and not
to "procurements" with a view to commercial resale. Consequently, it
does not provide a means to escape application of Article 1502(3) with
respect to most activities of state monopolies such as PEMEX and CFE.
There are other important provisions in the general text of NAFTA
that also help to round out this picture of the set of broad principles
designed to give each of the parties the framework to discipline their
economic regulators and state monopolies. For example, there are pro-
visions relating to "transparency" of and due process in administrative
proceedings."5 "Transparancy" is an issue that is viewed as crucial in
32. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1502(1).
33. Id. art. 1502(2).
34. 1 have paraphrased rather crudely some quite technical, complex and, I suspect, deftly crafted
provisions. See id. art. 1502(3).
35. See, e.g., id. art. 1804.
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the EC effort to create more competition in its EC-wide energy markets.
III. INVESTMENT AND THE MEXICAN STATE MONOPOLIES
I have left for last the most hotly debated issue that has surrounded
the NAFTA energy negotiation-the effect of the agreement on the
potential for energy investments by private sector parties from Canada
and the United States in Mexico. We have read a great deal in the United
States about the interest of the American oil patch in this issue and its
concerns with the PEMEX monopoly, and whether NAFTA adequately
deals with the issue.
At least as important is a general view from the Mexican side that
perhaps the most immediate value to Mexico of the conclusion of NAFTA
will be investments, and a hope that the under-investment in key areas
of the economy that was the legacy of the 1980s will be reversed. This
sentiment is strong as to energy. Energy infrastructure development took
a double hit in the 1980s, not only from the general economic malaise
but also from the specific diversification policies of the government. That,
of course, was greatly exacerbated in the case of PEMEX by the collapse
in world oil prices in 1986 that badly hurt the Mexican economy and
government and therefore, indirectly, hurt CFE as well. A critical need
for investment in the infrastructure of the natural gas and electric in-
dustries is already well recognized in Mexico. The steps taken toward
restructuring PEMEX, and the steps taken by CFE to open up electric
supply to co-generation and to independent power production, both appear
to be preparations for more open competitive markets in these industries.
It has always seemed to me that the fundamental approach suggested
by the oil patch-that the United States government should push hard
for major inroads into the PEMEX and CFE monopolies-was not only
unrealistic but also the wrong way to go about it. Changes in all three
industries controlled by these state monopolies will present the Mexican
government with a quite complex mix of domestic constitutional, political,
and economic considerations. In the long run, the same overwhelming
economic considerations that brought Mexico to the NAFTA negotiations
in the first place will surely encourage some level of privatization in the
energy sectors as well. Indeed, privatization may be essential if the
necessary investment in Mexico's infrastructure is to take place, and that
investment is needed if the entire economy is to grow as hoped. I think,
therefore, that the economic imperative to move in that direction is very
strong, but that it has to be done at a pace that the Mexican government
feels it can handle politically. A fast-track international negotiation is
not necessarily the best way to make progress in this area.
The net result of the NAFTA negotiation is that the PEMEX and
CFE monopolies are essentially in place. The agreement, however, makes
one major advance on the status quo from the United States and Canadian
viewpoints in that the scope of those monopolies, which has always been
something of a moving target subject to differing interpretations by the
Mexican government, is now identified with some specificity in annexes
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both in the general Agreement and, more significantly, in the Energy
Chapter. In Annex 602.3, while defining and preserving the basic core
of the protected monopolies, the negotiators also agreed to some major
advances with regard to both electricity and "natural gas and basic
petrochemicals" trade.16
Probably most significant are the provisions relating to electricity. While
"the supply of electricity as a public service," including "generation,
transmission, transformation, distribution and sale of electricity," is re-
served to the Mexican state as "a strategic area," there are nevertheless
important exceptions recognized in NAFTA that build upon changes CFE
had already planned or begun to implement prior to the negotiations. 7
The annex specifically states that "opportunities for private investment
in Mexico in electricity generating facilities" include: (1) "production for
own use," i.e., self generation for enterprises to meet their own supply
needs, subject to the requirement that any excess supply must be sold
directly to CFE and that CFE must purchase it; (2) co-generation, i.e.,
the production of both electricity and useful steam for industrial processes,
again subject to the requirement that the excess must be sold to CFE
and CFE must buy it (notable here is that the owner of the industrial
facility using the steam need not be the owner of the co-generation
facility); and (3) independent power production, i.e., owning and operating
generation facilities "independent" of CFE, again subject to the proviso
that the power be sold only to CFE and that CFE purchase it.38
The net effect of these three provisions will be to create a regime in
Mexico roughly similar to that developed under section 210 of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") 9 in the United States and
the independent power regime that has developed outside of PURPA.
As in the United States, the monopoly of CFE over the supply to end-
users will generally be preserved. In other words, competition is permitted
in the "bulk power," or generation markets that sell power to CFE,
but competition is not permitted directly with CFE to reach CFE's end-
use consumers. The workability of the regime will depend very much on
the sorts of rules as to pricing and other matters that CFE develops for
power purchases and back-up power sales to industrial users of co-
generation facilities. Because CFE had developed this liberalization outside
of the context of NAFTA, there is no particular reason to believe that
CFE will not strive to make the regime workable. Hence, what NAFTA
probably achieves is the prevention of backsliding by the Mexican gov-
ernment in this area.
Annex 602.3 also creates one potentially important exception to the
general proscription on service to end-users. In cross-border trade, Mexican
independent power producers may be able to access utility markets and,
36. Id. annex 602.3(3), 602.3(5).
37. Id. annex 602.3(1).
38. Id. annex 602.3.
39. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (1992).
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possibly, end-use markets in the United States directly. This should not
affect CFE's domestic supply monopoly, but it would affect its current
monopoly in the export of power to the United States.
With respect to the important area of natural gas and petrochemical
feedstocks, Annex 602.3 includes a somewhat similar provision as to
cross-border trade that will probably be of considerable importance in
natural gas trade. The language, while general and slightly vague, would
permit end-users and suppliers of natural gas and basic petrochemical
goods to enter into cross-border supply contracts. The implementation
of this regime is left both to the parties to the contract and to the
relevant state enterprise (typically PEMEX). The language suggests that
the state enterprise may -well act as the middle-man and require the
negotiation of individual contracts between it and each of the trading
entities. These contracts are also to be "subject to regulatory approval."
I suspect that these few words in Annex 603.2 will be pored over by
lawyers of potential trading parties and state enterprises for some time
to come. Again, how PEMEX views its role in this trade, and what
rules and regulations are developed by the Mexican government to govern
it, will be crucial.
There are other important provisions tucked away in Annex 602.3,
such as the ability of state enterprises to "negotiate performance clauses
in their service contracts." 4 Again, this appears to be an effort to codify
in NAFTA what may already be an accepted liberalization of PEMEX's
abilities in Mexico. Moreover, important general provisions, such as those
relating to government procurement, will affect the issue of energy trade
with PEMEX and CFE in important respects. How these provisions are
applied, and how the general provisions relating to competition and
monopolies in Chapter Fifteen are applied, may be as important in the
evolution of energy trade and to the issue of how far foreign investment
will be permitted in the Mexican energy sectors as either the Energy or
the Investment Chapters themselves.
If Mexico does substantially open up these markets to United States
investment, as it already seems to be doing in the electricity area and
at some point probably will do more overtly in the oil and natural gas
areas, the general investment rules in the Investment Chapter 41 will then
become more important. In energy, even more important will be what
specific regimes are introduced to define the relationship between the
private sector segment and the state monopoly eriterprise within which
most monopoly powers will still reside. Indeed, with respect to PEMEX
and CFE, the approach is likely to be one of the Mexican government
peeling off from the core monopoly segments of the business viewed as
less strategic and moving, over time, to those viewed as more strategic,
perhaps, but not necessarily, ultimately reaching the core of the strategic
monopoly itself. In electricity, this approach has already spurred the
40. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 602.3(4).
41. Id. ch. 11.
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opening up of the market for new generation to private sector investment.
In the PEMEX area, this approach has translated into redefining the
classification between basic and non-basic petrochemicals, thus expanding
the list of non-basic petrochemicals which are subject to fewer restrictions
on private sector investment.
Whether the entire core monopoly is privatized or not, how to deal
with the monopoly power inherent in sectors such as transmission will
remain. For the foreseeable future, the biggest challenge for the foreign
investor will be whether the regulatory rules that define the relationship
with the state monopoly are adequate to protect the investor against any
abuse of the monopoly or monopsony power in that state enterprise.
We have seen from the United States experience that the mere fact that
an enterprise is owned by the federal government does not mean that it
will not engage in anti-competitive activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to some critics in the United States, I think the energy
provisions of NAFTA are an important step, although certainly not the
only step, toward the development of a more productive energy rela-
tionship between the United States and Mexico, toward continued growth
in the U.S.-Canada energy trade relationship and, potentially, toward a
growth in trade between Canada and Mexico. In the energy area, perhaps
more than in any other, the real success of NAFTA will depend on how
it is implemented at a variety of levels in the 1990s and how the very
complex issues of energy regulation and state monopoly are dealt with.
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COMMENTS ON MEXICO-UNITED STATES ENERGY
RELATIONS AND NAFTA
BILL F. KRYZDA*
The macroeconomic picture for investment in Mexico has been im-
proving considerably since the beginning of the Salinas Administration,
even though recently there has been a slowdown in foreign investment
which is critical to the Salinas program of economic growth. Some of
the big areas requiring substantial investment, and areas of great im-
portance to Mexico's possibilities of growth, clearly are the fields of
energy, electricity, and oil and gas. Many of the North American oil
patch people are disappointed that oil was not on the table during the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' negotiations. But
I think you have to look a little more into the background of what is
happening within Mexico and not just expect a written agreement, ne-
gotiated in a year or less, to solve all economic and political problems.
The oil and petrochemical industries are especially sensitive areas.
Equally sensitive is power generation. We cannot lose sight of the fact
that we are in a transition period from a statist-type controlled economy
that is politically centralized, to a free market economy more demo-
cratically governed. Perhaps the proposal of NAFTA is not being made
at the best time. Timing, however is never the way one wants it.
The problem here, I think, is that when Salinas became President
(remember that he barely squeezed in), the major opposition group was
the Partido Revolucionario de Demoratico ("PRD"). It was very powerful
at that time and was led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, son of the president
who expropriated the oil industry. President Salinas could not overcome
his questionable victory over C. Cardenas by giving away the oil industry.
Undoubtedly, the energy industry is an area that needs tremendous
investment. It is recognized that the state electric company, the Comision
Federal de Electricidad ("CFE"), is very deficient and requires tremendous
restructuring and generation. The oil industry is said to be six to eight
years behind in its program of exploration. Some people in the business
tell me that you can never make that up. When you fall behind a year
or two, you cannot make it up the next year by just pouring more money
in. Therefore, it is a critical area economically.
In addition, there is the political problem. I think Mexico has been
very inventive in its solutions to many problems. We as lawyers in Mexico
do not have much experience as energy lawyers because this is a parastate
monopoly. We do not become involved to the extent of American or
* Goodrich, Riquelme y Asociados, Mexico City; B.S. and J.D., Northwestern University;
Graduate studies in economics at De Paul University, and University of the Americas, Mexico,
D.F.; LL.M. in Comparative Law, Southern Methodist University; admitted to bar of Illinois (1952)
and Mexico (1967).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
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Canadian oil and gas attorneys, except in the supply agreements. We
are, however, seeing much greater relaxation in the type of supply and
service contracts that are now being awarded to the private sector. This
provides a good opportunity to expand investment financing techniques.
How can one invest in the oil industry? Much can be done by foreign
or domestic investors in the technical areas through service agreements,
but financing is still needed. The government obviously does not want
to obtain loans that would remind it of the debt problems of 1982.
There are, however, schemes for lease purchase agreements or swap
agreements on the horizon. Performance contracts are now available,
which get people interested in service contracts and open that area up
to the foreign investor. I think it will be important to structure transactions
in such a way that the investment that is required for the service contract
can also be provided to the Mexican government. I do not, however,
have any magic formulas for how this is to be done. As one or two
people in other conferences have said, we lawyers have to start using
our imagination much more than we have in the past.
In comparison, there is also some feeling that the economic pressures
are such that we may see more relaxation in certain areas previously
closed off to domestic or foreign private investment. We are seeing some
of it in NAFTA, such as power generation. Even though there are
restrictions, those apply to production and not to distribution. Any
electrical power produced must be used by the producer or sold to the
CFE for distribution. When a private generator of electricity sells power
to the CFE, a NAFTA provision deals with the terms and conditions to
be agreed upon with the CFE.2
It is not clear to me whether that means that the other provisions of
NAFTA applicable to services and trade in goods apply. But, certainly,
the market is opening up. We have seen the Mexican government's desire
to open up the petrochemical area. Long lists of secondary petrochemicals
restricted to Mexican enterprise have been opened up to private and
foreign investment. The basic chemicals which continue to be restricted
are down to eight or nine. Some of us feel that the recent restructuring
of Petroleos Mexicanos ("PEMEX") is the first step in a long-term
liberalization of PEMEX operations.
2. Id. ch. 6, annex 602.3.
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QUESTION: You mentioned the drilling contract and the performance
aspects of that. Are there other contracts in the service areas where some
kind of performance standards are applied?
ANSWER, Lic. Ojeda*: Yes, of course. The most publicized service
contracts are the drilling contracts. But we have tried to be creative in
order to sign other international contracts with performance features.
Basically, we are working on the so-called ecological package of the
Mexican national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos ("PEMEX"). This
is composed of a number of plans involving the investment of more
than $700 million, to be financed through the Bank of Japan. We have
tried to be creative in contracting with major international firms and
also in allowing for the formation of coisortiums with Mexican entities,
such as Mexican construction companies. I think we have succeeded in
finding a way to work on those grounds. The performance features of
these contracts are in terms of time or in terms of high technology or
high efficiency. We are also working very hard on developing international
contracts on a turn-key basis. The need of investment in the oil industry
is tremendous. In the petrochemical area alone there is a need for more
than twenty billion dollars of investment. That is why the petrochemical
area is being radically liberalized.
QUESTION: What are the plans for the privatization of the gas and
oil industries and related industries in Mexico?
ANSWER, Lic. Ojeda: PEMEX is going to start with the privatization
of the petrochemical plants. The reason is quite simple. No longer being
under the exclusive control of the state, the national budget will not
incorporate these activities. In the petrochemical area, there are certain
major complexes that we will offer for sole or joint venture with PEMEX.
On the gas side, American companies will build the pipelines and
deliver them to PEMEX. The development of the gas markets and the
gas policy is going to be very important. I don't know yet what is
contemplated on the part of the transportation of the gas within Mexico,
which is now only being done by PEMEX and its own pipeline. I think
that in the gas area, we are going to see innovations and liberalization.
I don't know about privatization.
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